RT Journal Article SR Electronic T1 Why Shouldn’t You Invest in Companies with Revolving Door Lobbyists? JF The Journal of Investing FD Institutional Investor Journals SP 60 OP 68 DO 10.3905/joi.2016.25.3.060 VO 25 IS 3 A1 Emre Kuvvet YR 2016 UL https://pm-research.com/content/25/3/60.abstract AB This article analyzes the effect on firm value of having former government officials as lobbyists. The results suggest that the number of “revolving door” lobbyists is negatively correlated with firm value. The authors find that firm value decreases as the number of revolving door lobbyists employed by a firm increases. The results suggest that high numbers of such lobbyists are an indicator of wider agency problems in the firm.TOPICS: Legal/regulatory/public policy, security analysis and valuation